● OPERATOR OF RECORD · MICHAEL MOFFETT · accountable on every commit team@caliperforge.com
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Notes from the workbench.

Shipped tooling, build arcs, what is verifiable today. Newest first.

The reachability certification: sixteen seeds, hard alarm 2026-07-14

An external reviewer named a real gap in the standing planted-twin CI claim: a single-seed green does not exclude a lucky-seed miss on classes with long triggers. Same-day fix: a merge gate that requires the planted twin to fail on all 16 canonical fuzzer seeds. Two cases certified today, Euler Earn M-01 (Foundry) and Blend V2 H-01 (Rust/Soroban), both green at head. The reachability job is now the standing receipt behind the docs claim.

The gate that caught the secret-scan gap 2026-07-14

CaliperForge is a small AI-augmented contribution agency: one operator, thirty-nine specialized roles, each in its own single-context lane, each gated by a distinct reviewer role. Two weeks ago, one of those rails caught a gap in our own commit rail: the reconciler ran a secret scan, logged tainted paths, and committed anyway. Fix T-wave-c-close-f1-secretscan-2026-07-12 added the partitioning branch that refuses to land tainted paths, and a regression test pins the floor. Why the shape matters: same shape as the planted-twin CI receipts we ship for protocol audit tooling. The org caught its own gap because it had a rail that could refuse.

The audit already had it: Euler Earn share-accounting solvency as a runnable twin 2026-07-10

Pashov Audit Group surfaced M-01 in their public Euler Earn security review (2025-07-25): a share-accounting drift in PublicAllocator when a strategy’s share delta reaches the vault outside EulerEarn.deposit. Euler Labs shipped the fix at commit f07f6b1c5e1e (2025-08-11), merged in PR #22. This post walks the invariants that name the class and the clean/planted twin in caliperforge/euler-earn-invariants that fires on it: 256 × 50 fuzz against the real Euler Earn contracts through IntegrationTest, deterministic regression mirroring the auditor’s 4-call sequence, and a short shrunk counterexample on the planted twin.

The audited base had it too: Uniswap v4 fee-direction integrity as a runnable twin 2026-07-10

OpenZeppelin’s v1.1.0 RC-2 audit surfaced M-01 on their own BaseDynamicAfterFee: direction-blind fee arithmetic that computed against the wrong leg on exactOutput swaps. Commit 2678eb9 shipped the fix in tag v1.1.0; Zealynx’s Pattern 4 names the taxonomy. This post walks the direction-integrity invariant that names the class and the clean/planted twin in caliperforge/uniswap-v4-invariants that fires on it: 256 × 50 fuzz against the real PoolManager, deterministic regression, and a 1-call shrunk counterexample.

The reference hook had it too: Uniswap v4 liquidity-penalty conservation as a runnable twin 2026-07-06

The Uniswap Foundation ships a reference LiquidityPenaltyHook through OpenZeppelin. Zealynx surfaced the donation-griefing class (their Pattern 3); OpenZeppelin’s v1.1.0 audit surfaced it independently; v1.2.0 already ships the add-time fee-state guard. This post walks the conservation invariant that names the class and the clean/planted twin in caliperforge/uniswap-v4-invariants that fires on it: 256 × 50 fuzz against the real PoolManager, deterministic regression, and a 3-call shrunk counterexample.

5 billion SYS, one missing burn: Syscoin, SPV proofs, and the conservation invariant 2026-06-22

On June 7, 2026, the Syscoin bridge lost a reported $8.56M to a malformed SPV proof accepted as valid: approximately 5 billion SYS minted on the destination side with no corresponding burn on the source side. The conservation invariant a bridge must enforce, how a stateful test that tracks both counters finds the violating call, and how this maps to CI-verified conservation reference pairs on Anchor/Solana (cf-invariants-anchor, cf-invariants-jito) and Cairo/Starknet (cf-invariants).

The txs the proof validated but settlement skipped: Aztec’s cross-layer conservation class 2026-06-21

On June 14, 2026, approximately $2.19M was extracted from Aztec’s deprecated RollupProcessor contract. Proof scope and settlement scope diverged: the ZK proof validated all 32 batch slots; the L1 settlement loop processed only numRealTxs of them. The cross-layer conservation class, what CI-verified reference pairs cover today, and where the Aztec surface sits outside that set.

Authentication is not authorization: the TrustedVolumes access_control class 2026-06-19

TrustedVolumes lost a reported $5.87M because the settlement contract keyed its signature lookup on the caller (msg.sender) instead of the order’s maker. The invariant property that catches the class, mapped to CI-verified access_control reference pairs on Anchor/Solana and Cairo. No Solidity-rail pair yet, said plainly.

The planted-twin methodology: what it is and what it is not 2026-06-12

A clean reference where the property holds, a planted twin where it fires, both on the same CI run: why a checkable pair beats a claim. hyperevm-safety v0.1 to M2 in the same week as the worked example, and the Verus bridge-conservation reference as the one-line case. Not an audit; not a runtime monitor.

Exploit→Invariant Atlas, six cross-VM defender-side CI cases 2026-06-08

Six real-world hacks across Cairo, Move, Solana, and EVM, each with a runnable invariant that would have caught the bug class on the pre-exploit code under CI. First cross-VM defender-side benchmark of this shape: pre-deploy CI gate, not a runtime guard, non-EVM-led.